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Abstract—With the increasing threat of cyber attacks, ma-
chine learning techniques have been researched extensively
in the area of network intrusion detection. Such techniques
can potentially provide a means for the real-time automated
detection of attacks and abnormal traffic patterns. However,
misclassification is a common problem in machine learning
techniques for intrusion detection, and a lack of insight into
why such misclassification occurs impedes the improvement of
machine learning models. This paper presents an approach
to visualizing network intrusion detection data in 3D. The
purpose of this is to facilitate the understanding of network
intrusion detection datasets using a visual representation to
reflect the geometric relationship between various categories
of network traffic. This can potentially provide useful insight
to aid the design of machine learning techniques. This paper
demonstrates the usefulness of the proposed 3D visualization
approach by presenting results of experiments on commonly
used network intrusion detection datasets.
Keywords-network intrusion detection; machine learning;
principal component analysis; visualization;
I. INTRODUCTION
It is well known that Machine Learning (ML) techniques
have long been used for analyzing and extracting useful
information from data [1]. With the increasing threat of
cyber attacks nowadays, cyber security experts have un-
dertaken wide ranging studies on techniques for combating
such security threats. Network Intrusion Detection Systems
(NIDS) are potential automated solutions for protecting
online environments. As such, ML techniques have been
researched extensively in the area of NIDS as a promising
solution for automating the real-time detection of attacks
or abnormal traffic patterns in a network [2], [3]. For this
reason, it is vital to understand the significance and reasons
behind intrusion detection results that are produced by ML
models [3].
Misclassification is a common problem in ML. A lack
of insight into why such misclassification occurs impedes
the development and improvement of ML models. While
many studies on using ML in NIDS have presented improved
results when compared with other techniques, there is not
much emphasis on understanding the reasons for the im-
proved results or lower misclassification rates [4], [5], [6].
These studies tend to present numerical results in tables
or graphs to compare performances between different ML
techniques.
However, the underlying reasons for poor performance
in the detection of certain attack categories are not usually
explained and cannot be perceived clearly or intuitively.
Without a comprehensible approach to analyzing the reasons
for poor performance, the improvement of ML models
usually relies on a trial-and-error process due to the complex
nature of ML mechanisms [7]. More specifically, the design
of ML models heavily depends on the characteristics of the
training and testing datasets. Hence, an intuitive and ex-
plainable analysis on such datasets could potentially provide
insight on ways of improving current ML techniques.
Public network intrusion detection datasets, such as the
NSL KDD [8] and UNSW-NB15 [9] datasets, are com-
monly used as benchmark datasets for validating ML tech-
niques for NIDS. Information visualization can play an
important role in analyzing datasets. This is because dataset
visualization can facilitate mental perception and provide
insight into complex data structures. Furthermore, compared
to numeric data presentation, visual representation is more
inspiring and intuitive [10].
Various forms of visualization techniques have already
been applied successfully in the cyber security community,
ranging from 2-dimensional (2D) to 3-dimensional (3D)
applications [11], [12]. Existing research in cyber security
visualization covers a variety of domains, including for
monitoring network traffic characteristics [13], [14] and for
visualizing complex attack patterns [15], [16], [17]. While
studies have performed analysis on NIDS datasets [8], [9],
there is currently not much research on visualization systems
for providing visual representation of NIDS data, which can
provide insight and improve the design of a variety of NIDS
ML models [7].
This paper proposes a 3D visualization technique for
analyzing NIDS datasets. The purpose of the proposed
approach is to provide a visual representation of data from
NIDS datasets, in a way which reflects the geometric rela-
tionship between diverse network traffic data records, and
to create a way of examining the likely causes of ML
misclassification from a visual perspective. In addition, this
paper demonstrates results of a system that was developed
based on the proposed visualization approach.
II. BACKGROUND
This section presents a background to topics that are
related to the work in this research.
A. Information Gain
Feature selection is an important step in building ML
models. This is because only certain important features
in the data may be essential to the classification process.
The traditional approach is where security experts rank the
importance of features manually. However, it would be ideal
if an automated approach to selecting important features
could be used.
Information gain is an approach to this, where features
with low information gain can be eliminated. This is because
they are considered to be unimportant as they have relatively
small relevance on classification. Information gain can only
be calculated using discrete variables, and it is equal to
subtracting the sum of entropy for each subset of records,
weighted by their probability of occurring, from the entropy
of the target feature of the original dataset. A method of
calculating information gain is provided as follows [18]:
Let X and Y be discrete variables representing sample
attributes (x1, x2, ..., xm) and class attributes (y1, y2, ..., yn),
respectively. Then, the information gain, IGain, of a given
attribute X regarding a class attribute Y is calculated as:
IGain(Y,X) = Entrophy(Y )− Entrophy(Y |X) (1)
where
• Entrophy(Y ) = −
∑n
i=1 P (Y = yi)log2P (Y = yi),
where P (Y = yi) is the probability that yi occurs, and
• Entrophy(Y |X) = −
∑m
i=1 P (X =
xj)Entrophy(Y |X = xj).
B. Network Intrusion Detection Datasets
Network intrusion detection datasets are essential for
the development and evaluation of the effectiveness of
various techniques used in NIDS. Benchmark datasets that
are commonly used by the research community include
the KDD98, KDD CUP99 and NSL KDD datasets. These
datasets contain a number of different categories of network
traffic including normal traffic and attacks, such as Denial
of Service (DoS), probe attacks, Remote to Local (R2L)
and User to Root (U2R) attacks. However, it has been
contended that these network intrusion detection datasets
were generated more than a decade ago, and several studies
have highlighted flaws in these datasets [8], [19].
In light of this, the UNSW-NB15 dataset was proposed
as a contemporary dataset that was created as a hybrid
of modern normal and contemporary synthesized attack
activities of network traffic [9]. This dataset breaks down
the attack categories into other attacks like worms, shellcode,
exploits, fuzzers, etc. While experiments conducted in this
study focused on using the NSL KDD and the UNSW-NB15
datasets, the proposed approach is a generic visualization
method that can also handle other datasets.
III. RELATED WORK
The PCA technique is an important tool that has been used
in a variety of work, including for research on analyzing
network traffic for NIDS. Moustafa et al. [6] adopted the
PCA technique to reduce high dimensionality of network
connections. Hoz Correa et al. [20] used PCA for feature
selection and noise removal in NIDS, while Lakhina et al.
[21] proposed to use PCA as a statistical tool in network
anomaly detection. In their approach, network traffic data
was divided into normal and abnormal subspaces, before
statistical analysis was performed to detect anomalies. In
other work, Camacho et al. [22] introduced the main steps
of the Multivariate Statistical Process Control approach for
NIDS based on the PCA technique. They also suggested that
before applying PCA, the importance of each feature on the
classification process should be considered.
As ML is a promising solution for providing an automated
mechanism for network intrusion detection, there is a much
interest and a variety of research on this topic. For example,
Lin et al. [5] proposed a novel feature representation method,
which considers the geometric properties of datasets and
uses the k-Nearest Neighbor (kNN) classifier to detect
network attacks. Although their approach performs well in
detecting normal traffic, DoS and probe attacks, the detection
accuracy of their approach is not satisfactory for other
categories like U2R and R2L attacks.
Wang et al. [4] proposed an approach that first used a
fuzzy clustering technique to divide the training set into
several subsets. Then different Artificial Neural Networks
were trained on these subsets. Finally, a fuzzy aggregation
module was used to combine the detection results. Their
experimental results demonstrated high performance on in-
trusion detection using this multi-stage approach. Moustafa
et al. [6] propose a novel technique, called Geometric Area
Analysis based on Trapezoidal Area Estimation for NIDS.
While this approach is effective in detecting intrusions for
both the NSL KDD and UNSW-NB15 datasets, the reasons
for misclassification are not really described in detail.
Many studies usually do not describe the reasons for ML
misclassification. This is in part due to the incomprehensible
nature of ML algorithms, where many users regard ML as
a black box. Nevertheless, instead of using trial-and-error
process, visualization has been proposed as a critical tool
for improving ML models. This trend has attracted many
researchers, which has resulted in various studies on the
topic [7]. As an example, Rauber et al. [23] presented work
to visualize relationships between learned representations of
observations, and relationships between artificial neurons to
give network designers highly valuable insight into how their
systems operate. In addition, Liu et al. [7] proposed a visual
analytics system which facilitates understanding, diagnosing
and refining deep convolution neural networks.
There have also been a number of visualization ap-
proaches proposed in the NIDS domain. Yelizarov et al. [15]
presented a visual technique, which can be used to display
the overall status of the network and to show complex
attack patterns. A cyber security visualization system for
contributing to situation awareness by helping users to
understand the cyber security status and events, has also
been proposed [16]. McKenna et al. [17] designed a cyber
security dashboard to help network analysts in identifying
and summarizing patterns within network data.
In other work, Onut et al. [24] projected network data
in 3D space and try to distinguish different attacks in a
visual manner. Examples of several attack scenarios were
described and discussed in their work. A NIDS based on
2D visual presentation of network data was proposed by
Corchado et al. [25]. In their work, network traffic was
visualized based on 5 variables of each packet, namely,
source port, destination port, size, timestamp and protocol.
In their system, anomalies in network traffic showed up as
different patterns compared to normal connections.
Despite the many efforts in the development of visual-
ization methods in cyber security, visualization techniques
aimed at improving ML models for NIDS are scarce. The
work in this paper attempts to address this.
IV. PROPOSED APPROACH
The proposed 3D approach for the visualization of net-
work intrusion detection data for machine learning is pre-
sented in this section. Figure 1 provides an overall depiction
of the stages in the proposed approach.
The first stage involves the extraction of network traffic
records from the dataset. In view of the fact that in each
network intrusion detection dataset, minor categories like
worm attacks (in the UNSW-NB15 dataset), and U2R and
R2L attacks (in the NSL KDD dataset), only occupy a small
portion of the dataset, all the data for the minor categories
are extracted from both the training and testing sets. The data
from the remaining major categories are randomly extracted
until a certain predefined amount, e.g., 30% of the data.
While the full dataset can be used, the random sampling
of data from the major categories does not diminish the
quality of visual information, but it is useful to reduce the
visual clutter and the amount of required computation on
the visualization system.
The next stage of the process is to apply one-hot trans-
formation. PCA is not suitable for categorical data, as such
one-hot transform is applied to the features to transform
them into binary features. The transformation is done on
the training and testing sets individually. As a result, all the
possible features will be created because some features may
appear in the training set but not in the testing set. Features
that only appear in the testing set will be ignored. This is
Figure 1. Stages in the proposed approach.
followed by a normalization process to normalize the range
of the features. The purpose of performing normalization
is because the range of values for the features can differ
significantly. For example, some values may range between
zero to less than a hundred, while others may range from
0 to several millions. To correctly utilize PCA, linear nor-
malization is applied to each feature in both the training
and testing sets to normalize the values to the minimum and
maximum range of the training set.
As previously mentioned, Camacho et al. [22] suggested
that before applying PCA, the importance of each feature
in relation to classification should be considered. Thus, the
information gain of each feature is calculated to ascertain
the importance of each feature of the training set. Since
information gain requires discrete features, equal frequency
binning discretization is first performed. Then, the infor-
mation gain values are normalized between 0 and 1, and
weighted transform in applied by multiplying each feature
with the corresponding information gain value. As a result,
the variances of important features either remain or are
decreased slightly, whereas the variances of unimportant
features are significantly reduced.
To correctly apply PCA transformation, the mean of each
feature must be zero. Hence, all features are transformed
to zero mean in the training set, and the testing set is
transformed based on mean values of the corresponding
features from the training set. The PCA model is trained
on the training set and then used to transform both the
training and testing sets. The resulting variance of the first
16 principal components for the NSL KDD and UNSW-
NB15 datasets is shown in Figure 2(a) and Figure 2(b),
respectively. It should be noted that the first 13 components
are the most significant, representing 96.3% of the variances
for the UNSW-NB15 dataset and 98.7% for the NSL KDD
dataset.
Finally, to visualize these 13 components in 3D space, 13
non-parallel vectors are defined. The (x, y, z) components
of the 13 non-parallel vectors are provided in Table I.
The resulting 3D coordinate of a network traffic record is
computed as a weighted sum of its 13 PCA components,
c1, c2, ..., c13, with the normalized unit normal vectors of
the 13 non-parallel vectors, v1, v2, ..., v13. The result is
multiplied by a constant scaling factor, s, which is used
(a) (b)
Figure 2. Variance of the first 16 principal components; (a) for the UNSW-
NB15 dataset; (b) for the NSL KDD dataset.
Table I
(x, y, z) COMPONENTS OF THE 13 NON-PARALLEL VECTORS.
(x, y, z) components
v1 (1, 0, 0)
v2 (0, 1, 0)
v3 (0, 0, 1)
v4 (1, 1, 0)
v5 (1, 0, 1)
v6 (0, 1, 1)
v7 (1, -1, 0)
v8 (1, 0, -1)
v9 (0, 1, 1)
v10 (1, 1, 1)
v11 (1, 1, -1)
v12 (1, -1, 1)
v13 (-1, 1, 1)
to control the degree of separation between positions. The





Spheres with different colors are then rendered at these
positions to represent different categories of network traffic.
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This section demonstrates results obtained from the sys-
tem that was developed based on the proposed approach.
The UNSW-NB15 and NSL KDD datasets were used to
illustrate the results, and some representative observations
from these datasets are presented here.
A. The UNSW-NB15 Dataset
A 3D visual representation of the UNSW-NB15 dataset
as displayed by the system is shown in Figure 3. Figure
3(a) shows a visual depiction of a portion of the training
set, where the different network traffic categories have been
color coded to visually distinguish them from one another. It
can be seen visually that traffic from the same category are
typically clustered together. The visual representation of part




Figure 3. 3D visual representation of the UNSW-NB15 dataset; (a) data
from the training set; (b) data from the testing set; (c) empirical grouping
of data from the training set.
the visual representation of the training set with the testing
set, it can clearly be seen that the characteristics of both
sets are similar. This means that due to the similar patterns,
when training a ML model using the training set it is highly
likely that the model will be able to detect attacks in the
testing set.
Figure 3(c) provides an empirical grouping of data from
the training set. The groups circled in yellow depict sections
that mainly only contain normal network traffic, whereas
other groupings are circled in red. It can be seen from
the groupings that the traffic for generic attacks are well
clustered together. However, the traffic in the mixed groups
is not so well defined as they contain both attacks and normal
network traffic.
Figure 4 provides examples of certain groups for closer
examination. Examples of normal traffic clusters from the
training and testing data are shown in Figure 4(a) and
Figure 4(b), respectively. It can be seen from the figures
that the characteristics of the training and testing data are
very similar and that there are three clusters of normal traffic
within the group. The implication of this for ML is that
traffic in groups that contain nearly homogeneous records




Figure 4. Example groups from the UNSW-NB15 dataset; (a)-(b) a group containing normal traffic from the training and testing data, respectively; (c)-(d)
a group containing mostly generic attacks from the training and testing data, respectively; (e)-(f) a group containing mixed traffic from the training and
testing data, respectively.
detection performance. This is because their characteristics
have similar patterns with little variation between them,
which results in them being clustered together. Figure 4(c)
and Figure 4(d) show examples of a group from the training
and testing data, respectively, that contain mostly generic
attacks. Note that the statistics of the traffic in the group is
shown in the panel on the right. Since the group contains
mainly homogeneous records, it can be concluded that in
general the detection performance of most ML models on
these generic attacks will be high. The results from several
studies appear to support this conclusion [6], [26].
However, in other sections of the dataset, the traffic is
mixed together and there is no clear visual distinction be-
tween the different traffic categories within these groups. An
example of such a group is shown in Figure 4(e) and Figure
4(f) for the training and testing data, respectively. Such
sections of the dataset are where ML techniques tend to face
difficulties when it comes to the task of correctly identifying
the individual categories of the traffic. In addition, the figures
provide a visual comparison of the data between the training
and testing set. It can be seen that the training set contains
a number of analysis attacks, but there are none in the
testing set. There is a low number of worm attacks, which is
disproportional when comparing the numbers in the training
set with the testing set. Furthermore, as there is a significant
number of exploit attacks within the group, it is challenging
for ML models to avoid misclassifying other traffic in the
group as exploits.
Therefore, to address the problem of highly mixed groups,
a feature representation approach like the CANN method [5],
can potentially be used to transform these records before
the ML model is trained and also before using the trained
model for detection. In view of the fact that the training
and testing sets exhibit similar patterns, as can be seen from
Figure 3(a) and Figure 3(b), it can be anticipated that if a
feature representation approach successfully transforms the
training data into groups that contain mainly homogeneous
records, the same approach should be able to transform the
testing records into corresponding homogeneous groups.
B. The NSL KDD Dataset
Figure 5 shows the overall 3D visual representation of
the NSL KDD dataset as displayed by the proposed system.




Figure 5. 3D visual representation of the NSL KDD dataset; (a) data
from the training set; (b) data from the testing set; (c) empirical grouping
of data from the training set.
set, while Figure 5(b) displays part of the data from the
testing set. It can be seen that while the overall visual
distributions share relatively similar characteristics, the train-
ing and testing sets in the NSL KDD dataset have more
differences between them as compared with the UNSW-
NB15 dataset (i.e. the characteristics of traffic between
the training and testing sets in the UNSW-NB15 dataset
exhibited higher similarities). Figure 5(c) in turn shows the
empirical grouping of data from the training set. Like the
UNSW-NB15 dataset, it also shows that the data can be
grouped into several clusters.
From the visual representation, one can observe that the
data consists of groups that contain mainly homogeneous
records as well as groups that contain diverse traffic. Figure
6(a) and Figure 6(b) show examples of DoS attack traffic
from the training and testing data, respectively. It can clearly
be seen that the display of traffic within the group is isolated
away from the rest of the traffic, and contains mostly homo-
geneous DoS attack records. Similarly, another example of a
group containing highly distinguishable homogeneous traffic
is one containing probe attacks, as shown in Figure 6(c) and
Figure 6(d) from the training and testing data, respectively.
Due to the isolation and clustering of such homogeneous
data, ML techniques are expected to perform well when
identifying such traffic.
However, unlike the previous two examples, the main
difficulty faced by ML techniques in the NSL KDD comes
from previously unknown attacks in the testing set [27].
Even though the categories of attacks are the same in the
training and testing sets, the characteristics of these traffic
significantly differ. A visual representation of this comparing
the training and testing data is shown in Figure 6(e) and
Figure 6(f), respectively. It can be seen that in the training set
in Figure 6(e) that there are no attacks within this group. On
the other hand, there are many R2L and DoS attacks in the
corresponding group from the testing set, as shown in Figure
6(f). Despite the fact that ML models should be designed
based on the training set, ML techniques that do not consider
such abnormal characteristics may perform unsatisfactorily
when it comes to detecting such attacks.
It should be noted that the proposed 3D visualization
system is an interactive system that is displayed in real-
time. The user can freely navigate the virtual camera in
3D space to examine different areas of the display, to
obtain statistical information and also to extract selected
data from the visual representation for closer inspection.
While the current system deals with data from a network
intrusion detection dataset, the end goal is for the system
to be able to handle live network traffic. This will allow
cyber security experts to examine and recognize patterns of
incoming network traffic in real-time, and will be the focus
of future work.
The experiments conducted in this study show different
geometric characteristics in the visual representation of the
UNSW-NB15 and NSL KDD datasets. It was highlighted
that the main challenge presented to ML techniques in the
UNSW-NB15 dataset is due to sections that contain groups
with highly heterogeneous data, whereas the main challenge
in the NSL KDD dataset is due to the abnormal character-
istics of unknown attacks. This demonstrates the usefulness
of the proposed 3D visualization approach in identifying
patterns and clusters in the data. In order to address these
issues and improve detection performance as well as to
reduce misclassification rates, it is important for NIDS ML
techniques to consider these geometric characteristics in
their design.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper presents an approach to visualizing network
intrusion detection data in 3D. The aim of the proposed
approach is to facilitate the understanding of NIDS datasets
using a visual representation to reflect the geometric rela-
tionship between various categories of network traffic. This
can provide useful insight for the design of machine learning
techniques, such as to understand the reasons for high




Figure 6. Examples of groups from the NSL KDD dataset; (a)-(b) a group containing DoS attacks from the training and testing data, respectively; (c)-(d)
a group containing mostly probe attacks from the training and testing data, respectively; (e)-(f) a group containing mainly normal traffic from the training
and testing data, respectively.
A system was developed based on the proposed visual-
ization approach, and results of experiments on commonly
used NIDS datasets were presented. This demonstrates the
usefulness of the proposed 3D visualization approach in
identifying patterns and clusters in the data. Future work will
focus on the visualization of live network traffic to allow
users to examine incoming network traffic in a real-time
interactive manner.
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